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ABSTRACT
Among the obligations which countries are required to
impose upon their financial institutions under the Financial
Action Task Force’s (FATF) 40 Recommendations is the
obligation to report suspicions of money laundering. This
Article discusses the impact that a reporting regime such as
that set up in the United Kingdom in response to FATF
requirements is likely to have should it be set up in
developing countries seeking to regulate mobile money
services. This Article argues that certain features of the
U.K. suspicious activity reporting regime make it
unsuitable for wholesale adoption into such a context. A
one-size-fits-all approach by the FATF in establishing
suspicious activity reporting obligations is likely to reduce
the accessibility, affordability and attractiveness of mobile
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money services, thus impacting negatively upon the goal of
financial inclusion.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article seeks to draw upon the author’s research on the
United Kingdom’s Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Regime
in order to establish some preliminary points of discussion
regarding the impact that a similar regime is likely to have in
developing countries upon mobile money services which have to
comply with similar reporting requirements under the international
standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 1
SAR regimes are set up in compliance with FATF
Recommendation 20, which provides:
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable
grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a
criminal activity, or are related to terrorist
financing, it should be required, by law, to report

1

FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM &
PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%
20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May
%202012%20web%20version.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS].

2013]

REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY BY MOBILE
MONEY SERVICE PROVIDERS

403

promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence
unit (FIU). 2
Mobile money services have made financial services accessible
to millions of people in the developing world who are not able to
make use of banking services. Generally the service consists of
value being loaded onto and stored in a mobile phone account, the
owner of which can then use it to carry out everyday transactions,
such as grocery shopping and paying utility bills. 3 The service thus
consists broadly of a financial service (the maintenance of an
account) and a telecoms service (the transmission of transaction
messages to move value to and from accounts). 4 The provider of
the financial service (whether or not it is the same person as is
providing the telecoms service) will be liable to comply with
certain AML requirements, including customer due diligence,
suspicious activity reporting and record-keeping in accordance
with the FATF Recommendations. 5 In countries where large
swathes of the population do not have access to a bank branch,
these types of services have revolutionized the way that people
manage their finances. Accessibility and affordability of the
services are key to the success of the service and to financial
2

Id. at 19. The text of Recommendation 20 was previously found in
Recommendation 13 and Special Recommendation IV.
3
See, e.g., FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND
TERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011), available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/
AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf [hereinafter
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE]; PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING
MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS (2011).
4
See CHATAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12-14, who divide up the mobilemoney service into five elements or functions: (1) mobile communications
service; (2) customer interface; (3) transaction processing; (4) account
provision; and (5) settlement.
5
This is in line with the findings of CHATAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 28,
according to whom “the provider who manages the account records is in the best
position to supervise the AML/CFT procedures of the providers at the other
stages, and it may be advisable to place the legal burden for regulatory
compliance on that provider. This is because the account records function is
where the information about customers, retail outlets, and activity all comes
together.”
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inclusion, a major development goal for these countries.
I. FINANCIAL INTEGRITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Under the FATF Recommendations financial institutions are
required to comply with certain requirements as to customer due
diligence (CDD, which includes identifying the customer and
monitoring account activity), record-keeping, and reporting of
suspicious activities in order to protect financial integrity when
performing transactions for customers. The expression “financial
institution” includes any natural or legal person who accepts
deposits and other repayable funds from the public by way of
business and/or provides money or value transfer services to its
customers, by way of business, 6 but does not include “any natural
or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with
message or other support systems for transmitting funds.” 7 It
therefore includes mobile money service providers who provide
customers with both the financial and the telecommunications
services, 8 but not those that simply provide the
6

FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 115.
Id.
8
An example of this is O2’s Wallet service. O2, a telecoms company,
allows its customers to deposit money into their electronic wallet up to a certain
maximum per year. This maximum can vary among customers, some being
allowed £800, some £5,000, others £10,000. The service will only be provided
after CDD has been undertaken and the customer has been approved. See
Finance and Insurance Terms and Conditions – O2 Wallet Agreement, O2,
http://www.o2.co.uk/termsandconditions/finance-and-insurance/o2-moneywallet (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). A similar service, Beem, is provided by
Mobile Sense, also a U.K. company. See Mobile Money, BEEM,
http://www.beemme.co.uk/legal (last visited Aug. 16, 2012). The website
indicates that “[y]ou can open a Beem account wherever you are, you don’t need
to be online. To open on the go just text OPEN to Beem at 07624 81 66 66 and
follow
the
simple
text
prompts.”
Using
Beem,
BEEM,
http://www.beemme.co.uk/using-beem/account-setup (last visited Aug. 1, 2012).
In this case a user is prompted to register a debit card, which provides Beem
with a method of verifying the user’s identity. The limit allowed on a Beem
account is £300 within any thirty-day period. A Beem account does not require
linking it to a bank account. In this case the procedure for opening the account
seems to differ and may need to be completed online.
7
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telecommunications service (the sending or receiving of messages
for effecting money transfers over accounts held with others). This
means that in countries where bank accounts are ubiquitous and the
mobile service is simply used to send messages instructing the
financial institution to effect transactions over these accounts, the
mobile communications service provider can avoid being
designated a financial institution by simply acting as a conduit for
the bank to provide the service. 9 On the other hand the mobile
money service provider may itself want to provide the account
over which the transactions take place, usually because it is
profitable to provide the service in view of high demand. This is
particularly true in countries where large swathes of the population
do not have access to a bank account. In this case, the mobile
money service provider will be subject to anti-money laundering
(AML) and counter financing of terrorism (CFT) rules applicable
to financial institutions. Because the financial service would be
provided on a regular basis, the developing country in question
would not be able to exempt these businesses from the FATF
requirements applicable to financial institutions. 10
Ensuring accessibility and affordability of mobile money
services while at the same time protecting financial integrity in line
with international standards may involve far greater difficulties in
developing countries than doing so in the world’s advanced
economies. The table below gives a brief overview of factors that
are taken for granted in advanced economies that may, depending
9

See for example the products and services provided by Monitise, a U.K.
company, which appear to consist of messaging services allowing payments to
and from bank accounts to be effected over a mobile phone. Monitise does not
appear to itself provide financial (as distinct from telecommunication) services.
It simply provides the platform over which such messages may be sent. See
MONITISE AMERICAS, INC., http://www.monitise.com/ (last visited Aug. 16,
2012).
10
Indeed the exclusion may only apply when “a financial activity…is
carried out by a natural or legal person on an occasional or very limited basis
(having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria), such that there is low risk of
money laundering and terrorist financing.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 1, at 32 (emphasis added). Subsequently, “a country may decide that the
application of AML/CFT measures is not necessary, either fully or partially.”
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 20.
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on the service in question, constitute obstacles in the developing
world.
Accessibility
Register through existing bank account with local
bank
Proof of address
Proof of identity
Smartphone technology
Stable internet connection
Affordability
Regulation:
 Does not preclude market-entry by new
providers
 Does not make service prohibitively
expensive

AE 11 DC 12
?
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
AE

?
?
?
?
DC

✓

?

✓

?

Aware of the obstacles that are likely to arise in the
implementation of financial integrity measures, the FATF
published a report on the issue in June 2011. 13 This report
discusses instances of simplified due diligence which may be
applied where there is difficulty in obtaining regular proof of
identity and address by establishing alternative methods of
verification. It also discusses the potential to apply the general risk
exemption, 14 under which financial institutions may be exempted
11

Advanced Economies.
Developing Countries.
13
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3.
14
This exemption applies: (a) in strictly limited and justified circumstances;
(b) based on a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, and
(c) relating to particular a type of financial institution or activity. Thus the
application of the exemption depends on proving low money laundering risk.
This could be done using Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association’s (GSMA)
Methodology for Assessing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk.
See Marina Solin & Andrew Zerzan, Mobile Money: Methodology for Assessing
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks (GSMA, Discussion Paper,
2010), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/
Tool10.11.GSMAMethodology-AssessingAMLRisk/$FILE/Tool+10.11.+
GSMA+Methodology+-+Assessing+AML+Risk.pdf. In the Philippines this
12
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from complying with full CDD requirements in respect of certain
low-risk products. It gives illustrations of different ways in which
proof of identity and address may be obtained in places where
people may not be living at a formal registered address and may
not be able to provide formal proof of identity. For instance in
India for the opening of a certain maximum-balance and maximum
annual credits accounts, introduction and certification by an
existing account holder or any other evidence as to the identity and
address that is to the satisfaction of the bank, can suffice for the
purposes of customer identification. 15 Special provision is also
made for customers without any acceptable form of identity, such
as migrant laborers, opening what are called “small accounts.” 16 In
the Philippines would-be users of financial services from certain
rural areas can produce a Barangay Certificate (i.e., a certificate
issued by the elected head of the village) for the purposes of
customer identification and residence. 17 An interesting example of
the application of the general risk exemption may be found in
South Africa where Exemption 17 releases financial institutions
from address verification requirements in respect of certain lowrisk maximum balance accounts permitting only domestic
transactions below a certain value. 18 This exemption has reportedly
resulted in the more widespread use of financial services including
a mobile money service called WIZZIT. 19
After the service has been set up and the customer accepted as
such, the FATF Recommendations require financial institutions to
monitor their customer accounts and report suspicious activity.
This places certain burdens on financial institutions and affects
their relationship with their customers. Some salient features of the
system set up in the United Kingdom in response to FATF
requirements and the implications for developing countries
resulted in lower customer due diligence requirements for certain low-risk
customers of SMART Communications. See FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note
3, at 23.
15
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 29.
16
Id. at 33.
17
Id. at 29.
18
Id. at 32.
19
Id. at 33.
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wishing to promote financial inclusion through mobile money are
discussed below.
II. SOME FEATURES OF THE AML REPORTING REGIME
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
While much has been said regarding the difficulties of
implementing CDD requirements in developing countries, less
attention has been devoted to the problem of SAR. In response to
the FATF Recommendations, complex SAR systems have been set
up in developed countries whereby suspicious activity reports
(SARs) may be prepared and submitted by reporters and accessed
and actioned by the authorities. The successful establishment and
operation of such a system require the investment of time and
resources that may not be available in developing countries. Salient
features of the U.K.’s SAR system, administered by the Serious
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the difficulties of
implementing such a system in a developing country are
highlighted below.
As FATF Recommendation 20 suggests, the foundation of any
SAR system will usually be legal provisions laying down criminal
or administrative sanctions for failure by financial institutions to
file reports on suspicious activity (i.e., activity on their clients’
accounts which may constitute money laundering). In the United
Kingdom the failure to report an offense is enshrined in Section
330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA). The provision
applies to information obtained by financial institutions in the
course of business. 20 If on the basis of such information a person
knows or suspects or has reasonable grounds for knowing or
suspecting that another person is engaged in money laundering
s/he should make a disclosure by filing a SAR, as soon as it is
reasonably practicable to do so.21 Thus the offense includes
negligence-based liability. In other words, liability for breach of
20

Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, § 330(3) (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/UKpga/2002/29/pdfs/UKpga_20020029_en.pdf
[hereinafter POCA].
21
Id. at §§ 330(2), 330(4). This implements Article 22(1)(a) of the Third
Money Laundering Directive, which contains the same wording.
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Section 330 may arise not only where a person knows or suspects
and does not file a SAR, but also where a person should have
known or suspected, as there were reasonable grounds to do so.22
This introduces an objective test of liability. In order for the
obligation to arise, the person must be able to identify the
whereabouts of the person or laundered money or s/he must
believe, or it is reasonable to expect him/her to believe, that the
information may assist in identifying the person or the laundered
property. 23
The failure to report an offense is known as a secondary money
laundering offense. In certain circumstances, where it carries out a
transaction for a customer in spite of the fact that it suspects money
laundering, a financial institution may also be liable for the
primary money laundering offenses laid down in POCA, Sections
327-329, in particular Section 328—entering into or becoming
concerned in an arrangement which one knows or suspects
facilitates (by whatever means) the acquisition, retention, use, or
control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person. In
order to avoid such liability, consent to the transaction must first be
obtained under Section 335. In order to obtain such consent the
bank must make a disclosure by filing a “consent SAR.” 24 The
penalties for acting without consent are potentially very serious, if
it is proven that the act constitutes a primary money laundering
offense. 25
So what are the implications of these reporting obligations?
Starting first with the implications for the regulator, a stringent
22

Id. at § 330(2).
Id. at § 330(3)(a).
24
Having made such disclosure, in order to carry out the transaction for its
customer the relevant person must either receive explicit consent, or wait for the
expiration of the notice period, id. at § 335(3), or, where consent is refused
during the notice period, the expiration of the moratorium. Id. at § 335(4). The
notice period is 7 working days, id. at § 335(5), and the moratorium period is 31
days. Id. at § 335(6). If no consent is received and either the notice or the
moratorium period (if applicable) has not passed, the relevant person can do
nothing. If it acts, it may be liable for a primary money laundering offense, as
provided by Section 334(1). See R. v. Serious Organised Crime Agency, [2007]
EWCA (Civ) 406, [51]-[52], [2008] 1 All E.R. 465 (Eng.).
25
See POCA § 334.
23
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requirement with draconian sanctions as provided by U.K. law
typically results in large volumes of SARs, which can only be
useful to law enforcement if they are organized in and accessed by
end-users through a central database. In its early years the U.K.
SARs system experienced substantial backlog problems because
reports were submitted on paper and then manually inputted into a
database by the staff of the then National Criminal Intelligence
Service. 26 Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs)—the end-users of
the reports—had no access to the database, so SARs had to be
distributed to the end-users within whose jurisdiction they
appeared to fall. 27 In order to address these problems, the system
was reformed, so that the vast majority of reports began to be
submitted electronically, 28 and end-users were given direct access
to the ELMER database of reports in 2006. As a result SARs that
do not produce “hits” when database searches are undertaken will
not usually be followed up on or used in investigations. Because
LEAs with scant resources have to prioritize their work, the filing
of SARs relating to money-laundering transactions where the
predicate offense is a petty crime can therefore be a waste of time
and resources for the reporter, unless the SARs in question
supplement already existing intelligence. Furthermore, the fact that
so many end-users have access to the entire database, which is in
effect a database of suspects, can have important implications for
individual right to privacy and the confidentiality of personal
information. 29
26

See KPMG, REVIEW OF REGIME FOR HANDLING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORTS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 41-42 (2003).
27
Matthew H. Fleming, UK Law Enforcement Agency Use and
Management of Suspicious Activity Reports: Towards Determining the Value of
the Regime 27-38 (Univ. College London, 2005), available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/scs/downloads/research-reports/fleming-LEA-SARS.
28
SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIME AGENCY [SOCA], SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORTS REGIME ANNUAL REPORT 2011 10 (2011) [hereinafter SOCA ANNUAL
REPORT].
29
See EUROPEAN UNION COMM., HOUSE OF LORDS, MONEY LAUNDERING
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM VOLUME I: REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/activities/UK_Parlrep.pdf,
where the Committee observed that “ELMER is in effect a database of
suspects,” id. at 49, containing a large and ever-increasing number of entries, id.
at 48-49, which can be accessed directly by LEAs not only for purposes related
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From the point of view of financial institutions that have the
obligation to file reports, compliance with reporting requirements
is resource-intensive, in some cases requiring the setting up of
automated systems for the identification of unusual activity, and in
all cases requiring staff training and man-hours. 30 These costs may
have to be passed on to consumers in the form of increased service
fees and charges, which may reduce the service’s accessibility.
Where the necessary resources are simply not available, much
suspicious activity may remain unidentified and therefore
unreported. It is also important to note that the objective test of
mens rea coupled with criminal sanctions for breach of reporting
requirements gives rise to a certain amount of defensive reporting,
i.e., the filing of reports even if the reporter does not believe them
to be of any use to law enforcement, which is in effect a waste of
resources. 31 At the same time the objective test will not necessarily
deter service providers who are complicit with their clients in
to serious organized crime but also for other purposes such as “ensuring
compliance with tax obligations” and investigating “housing benefit fraud.” Id.
at 49. It also found it noteworthy that “[o]n receipt of a SAR no steps are taken
to confirm whether or not the suspicion on which it was based is well founded,”
id., and that SARs are only automatically deleted ten years following receipt
(except for SARs that have been amended or updated, in which case deletion is
postponed for six years). Id. According to the 2011 SAR Annual Report there
are currently 78 end users with direct access to ELMER. See SOCA ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 28, at 53. However the concerns of the House of Lords
Committee have been taken on board and some changes have been
implemented. All SARs older than six years will be deleted from ELMER, id. at
35, and access by non-police end-users will be subject to compliance with
Criteria for Direct Access to Suspicious Activity Reports. Id. at 34.
30
See Fred Hobson, Introduction: Banks and Money Laundering, in BANKS
AND FINANCIAL CRIME: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAINTED MONEY 3, 10
(William Blair & Richard Brent eds., 2008). See also Timon Molloy, Software
for Suspicion – One Institution’s Experience, MONEY LAUNDERING BULL., Feb.
2005, at 10-11; Timon Molloy, The Needle Hunters, MONEY LAUNDERING
BULL., Oct. 2004, at 3-4.
31
See KPMG, supra note 26, at 34; Stephen Lander, SOCA, REVIEW OF THE
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORT REGIME: THE SARS REVIEW 16-17 (2006); FIN.
SERVS. AUTHORITY, REVIEW OF PRIVATE BANKS’ ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
SYSTEMS AND CONTROLS 26 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/
pubs/other/money_laundering/systems.pdf; SOCA, SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
REPORTS REGIME ANNUAL REPORT 2010 14-15 (2010).
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hiding instances of money laundering. A good illustration may be
found in the United Kingdom case of R. v. Swan 32 where there was
ample evidence that both defendants should have been aware that
their facilities and services (safe deposit boxes and a bureau de
change) were being used for purposes which were not above board.
Swan was recorded on tape giving advice to undercover officers on
how to launder money through the bureau de change without
giving rise to the need for her to report 33 and how to hire a safe
deposit box anonymously. 34 Woolf had on occasion found illegal
items such as false passports and firearms in client safe deposit
boxes. 35 Thus the existence of the obligation in and of itself is no
guarantee of the usefulness of the reports that find their way to the
authorities.
A further problem is that if a consent system, such as the one in
the United Kingdom is in place, filing a SAR can disrupt business
and alienate clients. Two civil disputes which arose in the United
Kingdom between customers and their banks, Squirrell Ltd. v.
National Westminster Bank 36 and K. Ltd. v. National Westminster
Bank, 37 provide interesting illustrations of the awkward situations
that may arise as financial institutions seek to operate in the midst
of impossible conflicts between their duty to act in accordance
with the customer’s mandate and their duty to abstain from
carrying out suspicious transactions for the customer until consent
is obtained. Where a customer is attempting to effect a money
transfer, and especially in cases such as these involving the transfer
of substantial amounts of money between businesses in different
jurisdictions, the delay in effecting the transfers while a financial
institution awaits consent from the authorities will have an impact
not merely on the relationship between the financial institution and
its customer but also on that between the parties to the business
transaction (failure to make payment would put a business in
breach of its contract with its counterparty). While the financial
32

[2011] EWCA (Crim) 2275 (Eng.).
Id. at [3].
34
Id. at [4].
35
Id. at [7].
36
[2005] EWHC (Ch) 664, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 637 (Eng.).
37
[2006] EWCA (Civ) 1039, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 311 (Eng.).
33
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institution may not carry out its customer’s mandate (and indeed
the court held in the above cases that when a conflict arises
between a financial institution’s duties to its customer and its
duties under the criminal law, the latter should prevail), neither
may it explain to its customer the reason why, as, if it does, it may
find itself in breach of the tipping-off provisions in POCA 38 which
implement FATF Recommendation 21(b). 39 While the reporting
institution is protected, the customer is left, for all intents and
purposes, without a remedy, though the courts have shown some
willingness to hold SOCA accountable where it acts outside its
powers in withholding consent. 40 Any suspicion will suffice to
trigger the financial institution’s obligation to report—the
suspicion does not have to be reasonable. 41
III. PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTING A U.K.-STYLE SAR
REGIME IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY
It is not hard to envisage the problems that are likely to arise in
attempting to set up a U.K.-style SAR regime applicable to mobile
money service providers in a developing country. First of all, in a
developing country the application of simplified due diligence will
be necessary in many cases in order to achieve financial inclusion,
but where simplified due diligence is applied, it is not usually
possible to obtain a full client profile. As a result, identification of
38

POCA § 333.
This provides: “Financial institutions, their directors, officers and
employees should be . . . prohibited by law from disclosing (‘tipping-off’) the
fact that a suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being
filed with the FIU.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 19.
40
R. v. Serious Organised Crime Agency, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 465.
41
“Suspicion” is defined in K. Ltd. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, [2006]
EWCA (Civ) 1039, [16] as “a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the
relevant facts exist.” In the same case it was held that the existence of suspicion
was a subjective fact and that there was no legal requirement that there should
be reasonable grounds for the suspicion. Id. at [21]. In Ahmad v. HM Advocate,
[2009] HCJAC 60 [30]; (2009) SCL 1093, 1108 (Scot.) it was held that “There
is nothing in the language of s 330(2) which states or requires that money
laundering is in fact taking place. It is plain that the obligation thereunder can
arise if a person suspects or has reasonable cause for suspecting that it is.”
39
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suspicious activity will be harder, because the service provider will
not always be aware of the client’s background and what
constitutes unusual activity for the client. In addition, the ability to
file meaningful (and therefore useful) reports will be reduced, for
example because the client used an alias or because the reason for
suspicion is not included or is not sufficiently clear to assist in
gathering intelligence for an investigation. 42
Another problem is that, as far as reporting obligations are
concerned, under FATF standards no risk-based approach applies:
all suspicions must be reported. 43 Thus reports must be made also
with respect to suspicious transactions that are low-value and high
volume, i.e., transactions of the type usually carried out using
mobile money services. Service providers will need to train staff
and devote resources to make these reports in spite of the fact that
individual transactions do not present a significant profit margin.
This may mean that, depending on the circumstances, certain types
of customer may have to be excluded altogether. Furthermore, the
authorities will rarely have the resources to justify the investigation
of such alleged instances of money laundering, 44 at least not unless
the number and pattern of linked transactions indicates a
potentially serious problem. It is submitted that any attempt to
apply a consent regime to this type of transaction would be illadvised and likely to fail, both because the timely identification of
suspicious and unusual activity is problematic for the
abovementioned reasons, and because authorities are unlikely to be
able to respond to requests for consent with a promptness that
would allow the transaction to be carried out smoothly. Even if a
42

See Louis de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, Combating of
Financing Terror and Financial Inclusion: Questions to Consider When FATF
Standards are Clarified, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 361, 377 (2011).
43
See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 79: “All suspicious
transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of
the amount of the transaction.” See also FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED
APPROACH TO COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING:
HIGH LEVEL PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES 27 (2007), available at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%
20Principles%20and%20Procedures.pdf [hereinafter FATF 2007 GUIDANCE];
FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 40-41.
44
See de Koker, supra note 42, at 377.
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consent system is correctly implemented, it is likely that customers
will abandon mobile money services in favor of more efficient
informal payment methods.
A final potential issue involves evaluations of the system that
may be carried out by other countries or external entities such as
the FATF. In the past the FATF has criticized certain countries for
the low volumes of SARs being filed, a prime example being
Switzerland in 2005.45 If the same approach were applied in a
developing country, SAR systems may be geared by the regulatory
agencies responsible for them to generate defensive and overreporting in order to improve the country’s statistics. An undesired
effect could be the establishment of (informal) SARs targets and,
potentially, artificial filings by reporters in order to reach an
(informal) “quota.” This of course would lead to a further waste of
authorities’ resources.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis leads to a few important conclusions. It is
extremely difficult to construct an efficient and effective SAR
system. Even in advanced economies like the United Kingdom,
where a SAR system has been in operation for a considerable
period of time, there are still open questions as to the system’s
effectiveness. 46 The inclusion of financial activity taking place by
means of new payment methods such as mobile money within the
ambit of a SAR system will require that system to be adapted,
especially where a new type of provider, (i.e., a
telecommunications company rather than a traditional financial
45

“The number of reports of suspicions filed with MROS seems low given
the scale of the Swiss financial market and the activity that is carried out there.”
FATF, THIRD MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
AND COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM: SWITZERLAND 7 (2005),
available
at
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/
mer%20switzerland%20resume%20english.pdf.
46
See Miriam Goldby, Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Requirements
Imposed by English Law: Measuring Effectiveness and Gauging the Need for
Reform 1 J. BUS. L. (forthcoming Spring 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012448.
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institution) with different types of internal monitoring and recordkeeping processes, is providing the service. It is submitted that the
FATF reporting requirements do not differentiate sufficiently
among different circumstances and are not appropriately tested for
unwanted “side-effects” such as wasteful defensive reporting or the
shunning by consumers of regulated services in favor of informal
ones, which may be cheaper and more efficient due to the absence
of regulatory burdens.
In order to assist developing countries in designing a SAR
system that will achieve some measure of financial integrity in this
type of situation, FATF must do its utmost to move away from a
one-size-fits-all approach and identify the most effective means to
monitor mobile money transactions in developing countries. This
entails the possibility of doing away with a traditional SAR system
altogether and considering alternatives which allow countries to
tailor their approach to financial integrity to their own
environments. While the SAR system set up in the United
Kingdom may be suitable for the jurisdiction in which it operates
(and even this is as yet an open question), 47 the application of
suspicious activity reporting requirements in the same way in
developing countries would be unsuitable. In particular, red tape in
submitting reports should be kept to a minimum and, pending
development of an appropriate and reliable infrastructure for webbased communications, reports in all forms should be acceptable.
Depending on the circumstances, compliance with CDD and
record-keeping requirements 48 may preclude the need for SARs
except for actual and strong suspicions. Instead a service
provider’s records on a person officially under investigation could
be made accessible to LEAs. As we have seen in the U.K. system
SARs are put on a database which LEAs consult with search terms,
usually for known nominals, and do not usually of themselves
form the starting point of an investigation. This being the case, a
similar effect could be achieved if LEAs were allowed, under
certain conditions, to conduct searches of the records kept by
service providers, which would preclude the need to file SARs.
47

See id.
For a discussion of record-keeping requirements applicable to mobile
money service providers, see FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 40.
48
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When drafting provisions granting these powers, however, it is
important to build in safeguards against potential abuses by
governmental agencies, which may have the effect of discouraging
widespread use of mobile money services. 49
Finally, if a consent regime is put in place, it should only apply
to high-risk transactions, for example transactions over a certain
threshold value and/or transactions which the reporter knows or
has reason to believe are linked to a serious predicate crime such as
serious theft; fraud; corruption; the trafficking of weapons, drugs,
or people; or terrorism offenses.
Much research remains to be done into the effectiveness of
SAR regimes and this research should be undertaken before
attempts are made to make these regimes applicable to mobile
money service providers in developing countries. A one-size-fitsall approach is likely to result in many unintended effects which
will at best slow down the dissemination of this type of financial
service in the areas that need it most and at worst lead to its
outright rejection by intended users.

49

See Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper, Univ.
of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30041719.
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